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INTRODUCTION

The essays contained in Race and the Incidence of Environmental
Hazards: A Time For Discourse1 and the recent report by the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Environmental Equity:
Reducing Risk For All Communities2 represent what appears to be a reCopyright © 1993 by ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY
*

I derive this term from CORNEL WEST, RACE MArERS (1993).

* Lecturer and Coordinator of Academic Support Services, School of Law (Boalt Hall),
University of California, Berkeley; J.D. 1988, School of Law (Boalt Hall), University of California, Berkeley; B.A. 1985, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. I am thankful for the
insights on earlier drafts of the essay from several colleagues: Luke Cole, John Dwyer, Angela
Harris, Marjorie Shultz, and Rachel Moran. All shortcomings are, of course, my own.
1.

RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DiS-

COURSE (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992) [hereinafter RACE AND THE INCIDENCE].

2.

1 ENVIRONMENTAL

EQUITY WORKGROUP, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,

EPA230-R-92-008, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES,
WORKGROUP REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR (1992) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY]; 2 ENVIRONMENTAL

EQUITY WORKGROUP,

U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,

EPA230-R-92-008A, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES,
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markable consensus that low-income and minority communities bear a
3
disproportionate share of environmental exposures and health risks.
These two works also reflect the synergy of efforts by various elements of
both the traditional civil rights and mainstream environmental movements to address issues of "environmental racism." Indeed, the current
"environmental justice," or "environmental equity,"' 4 movement is a
combined effort of grassroots activists, academics, lawyers, bureaucrats,
government agencies, and concerned citizens to address allegations of
"environmental racism" and other environmental issues relating to communities of color and poor communities. 5
Current discourse between the two movements exemplifies that each
group has placed issues traditionally addressed exclusively by the other
group on its agenda: environmental issues have been placed squarely on
the agenda of the modern civil rights movement; 6 and social justice issues
are being put on the agenda of the modern environmental movement.
While the civil rights movement has historically focused on obtaining
economic and political rights for people of color, the environmental
movement has traditionally concentrated on preserving and conserving
our natural habitat as well as halting the proliferation of toxins and other
pollutants into the environment. The convergence of these two moveSUPPORTING DOCUMENT (1992) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY SUPPORTING
DOCUMENT].
3. ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY,supra note 2, at 3 (finding that these populations experience higher than average exposures to selected air pollutants, hazardous waste facilities, contaminated fish, lead, and agricultural pesticides in the workplace); see generally Paul Mohai &
Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Racism: Reviewing the Evidence, in RACE AND THE INCI-

DENCE, supra note 1, at 163 (reviewing studies finding distributional inequities by income and
race) [hereinafter Environmental Racism].
4. There is current disagreement as to the appropriate name for the movement. The
term "environmental justice" most accurately reflects the grassroots activism that has arisen in

the past decade in response to the disproportionate environmental hazard exposure borne by
poor and racial minority communities. See Charles Lee, Toxic Waste and Race in the United
States, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE, supra note 1, at 10, 12 (explaining the galvanization of
the current movement in Warren County, North Carolina, where community activists staged a
nonviolent civil disobedience campaign against the proposed siting of a polychlorinated biphenyl landfill in the primarily African-American county). Government bureaucracies frequently
describe the movement as one seeking "environmental equity." For instance, EPA in its ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY report noted that the disproportionate environmental risks borne by
low-income and racial minority communities and the response of government agencies to that
fact "have come to be known today as issues of 'environmental equity.' " ENVIRONMENTAL
EQUITY, supra note 2, at 2. Regardless of the nomenclature used, the movement is a clear
response to the disparate environmental problems that poor and racial minority communities
face. For purposes of this essay, I will refer to the movement, and its goals, as "environmental
justice."
5. See Lee, supra note 4, at 12 (describing the role of activists, academics, government
agencies, and others in shaping the current movement).
6. Illustrative of this fact is the recent elevation of Benjamin Chavis, who is responsible
for coining the term "environmental racism," to the presidency of the NAACP. See Neil A.
Lewis, Man in the News: Benjamin Franklin Chavis Jr.: Seasoned by Civil Rights Struggle,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1993, at 20.
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ments not only provides a name describing the intersecting concerns of
both movements, but also presents challenging and potentially groundbreaking paradigms to address those concerns.
One need not look much beyond these aforementioned works, however, to discover that formidable gaps, tensions, and disagreements exist
and will likely continue to plague any resolution of the issues surrounding environmental "justice" or "equity." To that extent, these two works
raise more questions than they resolve. Although neither Race and the
Incidence nor Environmental Equity explicitly presents itself as repre-

senting any particular element of the environmental justice movement,
both works reveal the types of responses that traditional civil rights advocates and mainstream environmentalists have utilized in addressing issues of race and environmental exposure. In this essay, I delineate
important issues of both agreement and disagreement surrounding the
merger of the environmental and civil rights agendas in the quest for
environmental justice.
At the beginning of Race and the Incidence, the editors pose the
question that frames the challenge from the traditional civil rights perspective: "Will people of color be able to redefine the traditional environmental movement to include issues of social justice?' 7 Within the
traditional civil rights paradigm, such redefinition may indicate an effort
to obtain equal rights for racial minority communities to clean air, water,
and land.8 It also signals civil rights advocates' embracement of environmental concerns that they traditionally viewed with distrust and
hostility. 9
A coherent theme, if any, to the essays in Race and the Incidence, is
the need to educate the public and raise its consciousness about the existence of environmental racism. Apart from this very broad thematic connection, however, this collection of essays does not present any
overarching theoretical framework for assessing or addressing questions
of race and exposure to environmental hazards.10 The essays range in
scope, from summaries of the current sociological research documenting
the disproportionate exposure to environmental hazards in poor and racial minority communities, to civil rights advocates' response to such unfairly distributed exposure in those communities, to historical analyses of
the mainstream environmental movement and its failure to address issues
involving race and the environment."I The shortcoming of this book,
7. Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Introduction to RACE AND THE INCIDENCE, supra
note 1, at 1, 6 [hereinafter Introduction].
8. Id.
9. See Lee, supra note 4, at 20.
10. The one notable exception is the essay by Michael Gelobter, Toward a Model of "EnvironmentalDiscrimination," in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE, supra note 1, at 64, discussed in
part II.A., infra.
11. RACE AND THE INCIDENCE, supra note 1, contains an Introduction, supra note 7, at
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and of the response of the civil rights movement in general, is the failure
to look beyond traditional frameworks of addressing racial injustices, especially given the changing nature of racism and the failure of those
frameworks to alleviate the causes of racial injustice.
I suggest in this essay that civil rights advocates should look to the
environmental law framework in pursuing environmental justice. Given
the limitations of civil rights law, the environmental framework is better
suited to address the phenomenon of environmental racism. Incorporating social justice and equity issues into the environmental framework will
undoubtedly involve challenging implications for environmental law and
policy. This review essay will explore some of those implications, and
specifically, what the quest for "justice" in environmental law and policy
will mean for its current framework.
Drawing from the essays in Race and the Incidence, I describe the
development of national consciousness around environmental justice issues in part I, from the first studies released showing a connection between race, class, and exposure to environmental hazards, to increased
community activism around the multifaceted issues intertwined with that
connection. In part II, I suggest that a fundamental weakness in the
evolution of the environmental justice movement is its failure to define
and clearly delineate the structural and institutional nature of environmental racism. This failure has led to a misconceptualization of the
problem, epitomized by the EPA report, and ultimately a denial of the
connection between race and hazardous environmental exposure. In part
III, I explore the different models utilized to assess and address the
harms from environmental racism under both traditional civil rights and
environmental harm paradigms. I conclude that although both models
of harm assessment have limitations, the environmental law and policy
model is better suited to address the harms arising from environmental
1, and a Summary, at 215, both written by Paul Mohai and Bunyan Bryant. In addition, it has
fourteen chapters: Lee, Toxic Waste and Race in the United States, supra note 4,. at 10; Dorecta
Taylor, Can the EnvironmentalMovement Attract and Maintain the Support of Minorities?,at
28; Henry V. Davis, The Environmental Voting Record of the CongressionalBlack Caucus, at
55; Michael Gelobter, Toward a Model of "EnvironmentalDiscrimination," supra note 10, at
64; Robert Bullard, Environmental Blackmail in Minority Communities, at 82; Patrick C.
West, Invitation to Poison?: Detroit Minorities and Toxic Fish Consumption from the Detroit
River, at 96; Patrick C. West et al., Minority Anglers and Toxic Fish Consumption: Evidence
from a Statewide Survey of Michigan, at 100 [hereinafter MinorityAnglers]; Beverly H. Wright,
Effects of OccupationalInjury, Illness, and Disease on the Health Status of Black Americans: A
Review, at 114; Harvey L. White, Hazardous Waste Incinerationand Minority Communities, at
126; Conner Bailey & Charles E. Faupel, Environmentalism and Civil Rights in Sumter
County, Alabama, at 140; Win. Paul Robinson, Uranium Productionand Its Effects on Navajo
Communities Along the Rio Puerco in Western New Mexico, at 153; Paul Mohai & Bunyan
Bryant, EnvironmentalRacism: Reviewing the Evidence, supra note 3, at 163; Ivette Perfecto,
Pesticide Exposure of Farm Workers and the International Connection, at 177; Mutombo
Mpanya, The Dumping of Toxic Waste in African Countries:A Case of Poverty and Racism, at

204.
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racism. Environmental law and policy, because they are preventative in
nature, are free from the constraints of strict remedial and causation requirements that characterize civil rights law. In part IV, I critique the
distributive focus of efforts to achieve environmental justice to date. I
argue that justice in the environmental context must be more focused on
the decisionmaking processes that determine distributive outcomes, particularly given the institutional and structural roots of environmental racism. Specifically, this model of justice will empower communities in the
decisionmaking process to be able to determine what impacts and risks
arising from hazardous environmental exposure they are willing to bear.
I also argue that environmental law's process-oriented decisionmaking
framework is well suited to accommodate such a model.
I
THE SHAPING OF A MOVEMENT

As many of the essays in the book Race and the Incidence attest to,
the environmental justice movement has emerged from a primarily local,
grassroots response to the siting of hazardous waste facilities in poor,
racial minority communities.12 Emerging national consciousness about
racial disparities in hazardous environmental exposure can be traced to
the release of two studies in the mid to late 1980's: a 1983 study by the
United States General Accounting Office (GAO) and a 1987 study by the
13
United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice (UCC). Similar research documenting the relationship between race, class, and exposure to environmental hazards had preceded these studies. The
widespread attention given to these two studies, however, raised the public's level of consciousness about the scope of that relationship to an un4
precedented degree.'
At the time of its release, the GAO study was one of the few environmental studies that established a correlation between race and proximity to toxic substances.15 However, since the GAO study was limited
in regional scope, 16 the UCC study has become the focus of the current
12. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 4 (describing several communities that are resisting the siting of hazardous landfills in their communities); White, supra note 11 (discussing hazardous
waste incineration).
13. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND
THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED
CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL
REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SoCIo-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH
HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987).
14. See Lee, supra note 4, at 10-11; Environmental Racism, supra note 3, at 163.
15. Lee, supra note 4, at 12.
16. The GAO study investigated the location of hazardous waste sites in the Southeastern
region of the United States. It found that three of the four landfills in the Southeast are located
in predominantly poor and African-American communities. GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at
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environmental justice movement because of "its national scope and because of its strong and unequivocal findings regarding the distribution of
commercial hazardous waste facilities."' 7 The UCC study documented
both racial and socioeconomic demographic patterns associated with the
location of hazardous waste sites across the United States. In his essay,
Toxic Waste and Race in the United States, Charles Lee, the author of
the UCC study, summarizes his findings:
Communities with a single hazardous waste facility were found to have
twice the percentage of minorities as communities without such a facility
(24 percent vs. 12 percent). Communities with two or more facilities
have more than three times the minority representation than communities without any such sites (38 percent vs. 12 percent). Although, as expected, communities with hazardous waste sites generally proved to have
lower socio-economic status, the economic status of residents was not as
good a predictor of a facility's existence as race itself.' 8
While the GAO and UCC studies documented a connection between race, class, and the location of hazardous waste facilities, other
studies have provided similar documentation for other environmental
hazards ranging from air pollution to the consumption of toxic fish. In
their essay, Environmental Racism: Reviewing the Evidence, Paul Mohai
and Bunyan Bryant summarize the evidence from fifteen studies conducted between 1971 and 1992 that "provide systematic information
about the social distribution of environmental hazards."' 19 Each of the
studies (including the UCC and GAO studies) measured the distribution
of environmental hazards by correlating the average median household
and family income of the community and the minority percentage of the
community with the degree of exposure to the hazard. 20 Most concluded
that the distribution of the environmental hazard studied was inequitable
by both income and race. 2 1 The totality of the studies, and specifically
the UCC's conclusion that the relationship between race and the location
1.
17. EnvironmentalRacism, supra note 3, at 163. Toxic emissions released in the air from
hazardous waste facilities have been shown to cause a variety of health problems including
cancer, genetic damage, birth defects, reproductive disorders, and nervous system damage.
White, supra note 11, at 126-28. Moreover, health problems can also stem from stress associated with feelings of helplessness of people chronically exposed to toxic emissions from facilities located in their communities. Id. at 129. Stress related illnesses weaken the body's ability
to fight off potential diseases and leave those in the community with a heightened sense of fear
and anxiety in their everyday lives. Id.
18. Lee, supra note 4, at 14-15.
19. See Environmental Racism, supra note 3, at 165-69 (reviewing studies on air pollution, solid waste, pesticides, and toxic fish consumption); Minority Anglers, supra note 11, at
100.
20. EnvironmentalRacism, supra note 3, at 165.
21. See id. at 166. Studies have gone further to conclude that race alone is a more potent
factor in measuring which communities are likely to bear a disproportionate share of environmental hazards. In fact, the UCC study is most often cited for its conclusion that race is the
most important predictor in the location of hazardous waste facilities, even when socioeco-
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of hazardous waste facilities could not be explained by chance but rather
by race or some factor related to race, 2 2 cemented into national consciousness a new term in environmental and civil rights activism: "envi' 23
ronmental racism.
That the scope of the current research begs for a further investigation of the relationship among race, class, and exposure to environmental
hazards other than toxic waste sites is obvious. As Mohai and Bryant
note, most of the studies conducted to date have focused on the exposure
of various communities to air pollution and hazardous waste. 24 National, systematic studies on the relationship of race, class, and the exposure to other "environmental hazards," such as water pollution,
pesticides, asbestos, lead poisoning, and toxic fish consumption, are noticeably lacking. 25 These honest assessments of the weaknesses in the
documentation of the phenomenon of environmental racism should not
be seen as an expression of doubt that poor and racial minorities bear the
disproportionate burden of environmental hazards. Rather, such assessments should be taken as an indication of the need to conduct more research and to educate the public further about the widespread nature of
the phenomenon.
Though the movement for environmental justice existed on a local,
grassroots level prior to the release of the GAO and UCC studies, these
studies nevertheless became a major catalyst for activists seeking justice
in environmental policymaking and in the distributional outcomes of ennomic factors are taken into account. E.g., id. at 163; Lee, supra note 4, at 14-15.
Mohai and Bryant draw the following conclusions about the aggregate significance of
existing research:
[R]egardless of the environmental hazard and regardless of the scope of the study, in
nearly every case the distribution of pollution has been found to be inequitable by
income. And with only one exception, the distribution of pollution has been found to
be inequitable by race. Where the distribution of pollution has been analyzed by both
income and race (and where it was possible to weigh the relative importance of each),
in most cases race has been found to be more strongly related to the incidence of
pollution.
Environmental Racism, supra note 3, at 167.
22. The UCC study, and other similar studies, attributed certain race-related factors as
playing a significant role in the location of toxic waste facilities. Some of these factors include:
"1) the availability of cheap land, often located in minority communities and neighborhoods;
2) the lack of local opposition to the facility, often resulting from minorities' lack of organization and political resources as well as their need for jobs; and 3) the lack of mobility of minorities resulting from poverty and housing discrimination that traps them in neighborhoods
where hazardous waste facilities are located." Environmental Racism, supra note 3, at 164
(citations omitted).
23. Lee, supra note 4, at 10 (noting the coining of the term by the then Executive Director of the UCC, Dr. Benjamin Chavis, Jr., after the release of the UCC study).
24. Environmental Racism, supra note 3, at 165.
25. While some studies have documented some connection between exposure to certain
hazards, such as pesticide exposure or toxic fish consumption, and race and socioeconomic
demographics, these studies have been limited either in geographic scope or inconclusive as to
the relative weight of race and class in the exposure rates of these hazards. See Environmental
Racism, supra note 3, at 167-69.
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vironmental degradation. Armed with this increased consciousness and
confirmation from the research documenting racial and socioeconomic
disparities in toxic exposures, cadres of concerned citizens, activists, academics, and lawyers around the country continue to mobilize around the
environmental threat to poor and minority communities. 26 They have
done so, as Robert Bullard explains, primarily by becoming" 'experts' on
the toxics issue" and by "adopt[ing] confrontational strategies (e.g., protests, neighborhood demonstrations, picketing, political pressure, litigation, etc.) to reduce and eliminate environmental stressors."'27 In doing
so, environmental justice advocates have uncovered some of the precipitating factors underlying the disparities in environmental hazards
exposure.
One of the primary factors that have influenced the disproportionate
location of environmental toxins and hazards in communities of color is
the "Not In My Backyard" (NIMBY) syndrome. The NIMBY syndrome consists of public opposition from more vocal, and politically
powerful, middle and upper income communities to the siting of a toxic
facility, or other "Locally Unwanted Land Use" (LULU) in their neighborhoods. 28 As more affluent communities become increasingly vocal in
their opposition, calling for the facilities to be sited "somewhere else,"
private industries have shifted their siting efforts toward other communities. 29 As Robert Bullard explains: "'Somewhere Else USA' often ends
up being located in poor, powerless, minority communities. ' 30 Since
"[m]inority communities do not have the resources, or [government and
industry] contacts, to initiate or sustain the proactive behavior found in
more affluent communities, ' '3 ' toxic facilities and other environmental
hazards end up in those communities.
A practice related to the NIMBY syndrome is "environmental
blackmail," whereby "[c]ommunities that agree to host hazardous waste
and other noxious facilities are promised compensation in an amount
such that the perceived benefits outweigh the risks."' 32 This phenomenon
is based on the notion that the existence of noxious facilities and other
hazards in minority communities constitutes an "economic tradeoff" for
having jobs near "poverty pockets."'3 3 Companies offering economic incentives have frequently succeeded in convincing affected communities
that reforms in environmental policies, and opposition to toxic facility
26. See Lee, supra note 4, at 18 (noting the grassroots activism growing out of increased
awareness from the documentation of the impact of toxic hazards in minority communities).
27. Bullard, supra note 11, at 87, 90.
28. Id. at 85.
29. Id. at 85, 91.

30. Id. at 85.
31.
32.
33.

White, supra note 11, at 135.
Bullard, supra note 11, at 84.
Id. at 84, 86.
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sitings, will result in plant closures, layoffs, and economic dislocation. 34
Minority communities are often vulnerable to such inducements and
minimize their opposition to sitings because they are beset by rising unemployment, extreme poverty, a shrinking tax base, and a decaying busi35
ness infrastructure.
Of the factors believed to influence the distributional outcomes of
environmental hazards, perhaps the most deceptive to environmental justice advocates is the invocation by private industry of race-neutral
grounds in targeting certain communities for hazardous waste facilities.
Often no visible smoking gun exists behind the decision to place a toxic
facility in a neighborhood composed primarily of racial minorities. The
reasons frequently given by companies for siting are that such communities have low-cost land, sparse populations, and desirable geological attributes. 36 These sites typically also tend to have poorer, politically
disenfranchised populations. 37 In pointing to siting decisions as evidence
of "racism," environmental justice advocates have begun to draw a connection between such race-neutral factors and their racial implications.
For instance, as Conner Bailey and Charles Faupel explain, although low
population density is related to natural resource endowments and economic opportunity, it is all too often a good indicator of poverty in rural
areas. 38 In turn, poverty is often a good indicator of the racial makeup of
a community.3 9 Such connections lend credence to claims of environmental racism and, more particularly, to the contention that the distribution of hazardous environmental exposure cannot be understood in
4
isolation from race. 0

Ultimately, however, it is the "success" of environmental laws that
leads to the racially disparate outcomes in the distribution of environ34. Id. at 83.
35. Id. at 84. Robert Bullard suggests that, aside from adding to the racial disparities in
exposure, "environmental blackmail" policies raise a far broader moral issue: "That is, should
one part of society (the affluent) pay another part of society (the disadvantaged) to accept the
risks that others can afford to escape[?]" Id. These risks are becoming less acceptable to
communities of color, in part, because of the realization that negotiated economic benefits may
not be sufficient to compensate them for the long-term and life-threatening illnesses that may
beset their communities. Introduction, supra note 7, at 7. As communities of color become
aware of the health risks and siting inequities resulting from environmental hazards, the appeal
of economic incentives becomes increasingly diluted. Bullard, supra note 11, at 93.
36. Joan Bernstein, The Siting of Commercial Waste Facilities:An Evolution of Community Land Use Decisions, I KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 83, 83-84 (1991) (Vice President of Environmental Policy and Ethical Standards at Waste Management describing historical site
selection as being governed by economic factors); Bailey & Faupel, supra note 11, at 150.
37. Bailey & Faupel, supra note 11, at 150.
38. Id. ("Among Alabama's 67 counties, the ten with the lowest population densities also
have average per capita incomes well below the state average .... ").
39. Id. (noting that Blacks are a majority in six of ten Alabama counties with the lowest
population densities and lower than average per capita incomes).
40. Id. at 151.
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mental hazards. 41 Although environmental laws promise uniform protection from known environmental hazards, environmental justice
advocates believe that governmental intervention aggravates the regressive distribution of such hazards. 42 For instance, in spite of claims of
broad-based protection by federal legislation, laws like the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 43 leave farmworkers unprotected
in the interest of economic efficiency and industry preferences." Moreover, because of the procedural emphasis in many environmental laws,
hazardous waste siting decisions are often political decisions, which leave
historically excluded people out of the decisionmaking processes. 45 The
result is that while "rich neighborhoods are able to leverage economic
and political clout into fending off unwanted uses," poor and minority
neighborhoods are left without a choice except to tolerate various un46
wanted toxic facilities.
As the essays in Race and the Incidence reflect, much of the shaping
of the environmental justice movement to date has come from the discovery of the disparate outcomes in exposure to environmental hazards and
a fairly in-depth exploration of the multifaceted reasons behind those
outcomes. To that extent, the essays constitute a thorough primer for
those unfamiliar with the phenomenon now commonly referred to as environmental racism. What is markedly absent from the book of essays,
and from the movement in general, is a theoretically sound articulation
of the concept of environmental racism and the implications of calls for
social justice in environmental policy and decisionmaking. That these
weaknesses can lead the concept of environmental racism, and the quest
for environmental justice, to an epistemological abyss is made painstakingly evident in EPA's Environmental Equity Report. How this is allowed to happen, and possible responses from environmental justice
advocates, are the subject of the remainder of this essay.
41. See Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need
for EnvironmentalPoverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 643 (1992) ("Mainstream environmentalists see pollution as the failure of government and industry," whereas "grassroots activists
come to view pollution as the success of government and industry ....
42. Gelobter, supra note 10, at 64.
43. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
44. Perfecto, supra note 11, at 177, 182-83 (noting that the Act permits registration, for
experimental use, of unregistered and untested pesticides and thus allows farmworkers to be
used as "guinea pigs"); see also Cole, supra note 41, at 643.
45. Bullard, supra note 11, at 85; see also Cole, supra note 41, at 646 ("In the end, it is
those with political clout who win in the administrative process or siting decision.").
46. Bullard, supra note 11, at 85.
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II
UNDERSTANDING

AND THEORIZING "ENVIRONMENTAL
RACISM"

A.

Epistemological Weaknesses

To be sure, the term "environmental racism" has come to be associated with various studies demonstrating that racial minority communities are more likely than their majority counterparts to live near housing
with lead-based paint and near freeways, sewer treatment plants, municipal and hazardous waste landfills, air pollution, and other environmental
and health hazards. On its face, then, a fair construction of this term
could be understood to mean exactly what the research has shown. That
is, racial minority communities are disproportionately exposed to a variety of environmental hazards. The racism is deemed inherent in the disparate or inequitable outcomes (i.e., exposure).
To the extent that the construction of the term "environmental racism" relies upon the disparity of outcomes for its normative strength,
however, it suffers from formidable weaknesses. Classifying the racial
disparities in exposure rates to environmental hazards as environmental
racism invites a fundamental theoretical challenge. That is, what do we
mean when we call an outcome "racist" or evidence of "racism"? Noting
that "environmental" modifies "racism" in the term "environmental racism," Gerald Torres cautions:
[I]n order to make sense of the term [environmental racism] one must
have a clear idea of what it means to call a particular activity racist.
Racism is one of those terms in contemporary political usage that is
highly charged and which has an apparent meaning. The meaning of the
term is clouded to the extent that it gets broadly applied to a variety of
activities and outcomes. But racism has been and should be a term of
special opprobrium. We risk having the term lose its condemnatory force
by using it too often or inappropriately. By calling something racist
when another term might suffice [sic] risks subjecting the word to a kind
of verbal inflation.

47

Legally, and even socially, "racism" has been construed to mean
intentional or purposeful conduct on the basis of race, or at least some
consciousness of race as a factor motivating conduct. 4 8 Moreover, such
47. Gerald Torres, Introduction: UnderstandingEnvironmental Racism, 63 U. COLO. L.
REV. 839, 839 (1992).
48. See generally Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (explaining establishment of the
intent/purpose requirement in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and its further inculcation in equal protection/race discrimination jurisprudence as a necessity in establishing
actionable "racism"). Because of this intent requirement, a showing of a racially disparate
impact of facially neutral law or decision is insufficient without showing specific racial animus.
Lawrence, supra, at 318-19.
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construction requires that the intent be attached to an individual actor. 49
Labeling the outcomes that correlate race and exposure to environmental
hazards as "racist" invites the demand for evidence of an overt raceconscious impetus and a "single bad actor."50
Indeed, the term "environmental racism" begs the causation question. Current constructions of racism insist on a neat correlation between the cause of the racial injury and intentional conduct on the basis
of race. 51 For instance, in concluding that evidence that toxic waste facilities are located disproportionately in minority communities constitutes environmental racism, does it matter whether communities of color
are "targeted" by the government or the industry for siting such facilities
because of the racial composition of such communities? Does it matter
which came to the neighborhood first, the facility or the poor and/or the
minorities? Facts showing that the communities were disproportionately
poor and/or minority at the time the facility was sited would provide
some evidence that siting decisions may have been racially motivated or
that the siting decision has a disproportionate effect on those communities.5 2 Without such evidence, the charge of environmental racism is
open to the counterargument that if a community was not predominantly
minority at the time a siting decision was made, then the result-that the
community then became minority-is not racist. 53 Rather, the results
49. See Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-57
(1978) (arguing that antidiscrimination law is based upon a model of discrimination that is

focused on individual actors through a "perpetrator" perspective).
50. Lawrence, supra note 48, at 318-19; see also Cole, supra note 41, at 642. Cole describes the legal-scientific environmental movement's law and policy approach as the "single
bad actor" approach: pollution occurs only when "a particular actor (such as a polluting corporation) acts outside societal norms; laws are written to punish particular violators of pollution standards." Id.
51. Alan Freeman, AntidiscriminationLaw: The View from 1989, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1407,
1418 (1990); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D.
Tex. 1979), aff'd without op., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). In Bean, the district court held
that plaintiffs "must show not just that the decision [to grant a permit to site a solid waste
facility] is objectionable or even wrong, but that it is attributable to an intent to discriminate
on the basis of race." Id.; see also Vicki Been, What's FairnessGot To Do With It?: Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally UndesirableLand Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001,
1016-17 (1993) (describing the "causation" objection to environmental racism claims as posing
the question whether the disproportionate location of LULU's in racial minority communities
results from the siting process or from the dynamics of the housing market).
52. But see R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), afid, 977 F.2d 573
(4th Cir. 1992). In R.LSE., Inc., the district court found no discriminatory intent in the siting
of a landfill in a predominantly Black area of a county despite evidence that, during the past 20
years, the county's three other landfills had been placed within one mile of neighborhoods that
were respectively 100%, 95%, and 100% Black. The court concluded that though the placement of landfills has had a disproportionate impact on Black residents, "the Equal Protection
Clause does not impose an affirmative duty to equalize the impact of official decisions on different racial groups." 768 F. Supp. at 1150. Instead, the clause "merely prohibits government
officials from intentionally discriminating on the basis of race." Id.
53. See, e.g., Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 677. In refusing to grant a preliminary injunction, the
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instead reflect the dynamics of a "free market. ' ' 54 Indeed, the invariable
judicial response to claims of environmental racism has been a rejection
of those claims for failure to prove the requisite discriminatory intent and
causation, notwithstanding demonstrations of disparate impact and dis55

criminatory outcomes.
That claims of environmental racism have not fit into the existing
legal construction of racism is not surprising given increasingly stringent
judicial requirements of intent and causation. There is, however, a more
fundamental weakness that leaves the concept of environmental racism
penetrable. This weakness is the failure to explicate, and a general lack
of understanding of, the structural nature of contemporary racial oppression and subordination. Historically, disparate racial treatment and impacts were easily traceable to overt, racially motivated actions. However,
partly as a result of laws that punish and forbid such overt behavior, the
nature of racism has become appreciably more subtle and structural. 56 A
decisionmaker will often not seek a discriminatory outcome; the decision
will reflect, rather, the influence of unconscious cultural and social attitudes. 57 Thus, contemporary racism cannot be understood apart from
Bean court held that certain factual issues relevant to the establishment of discriminatory purpose needed to be resolved at trial. Among those issues was the question of whether the company proposing to site the facility at issue was informed of the racial composition of the
community at the time of the siting. Id. at 680-81.
54. See Been, supra note 51, at 1017 (arguing that "market dynamics" have significantly
contributed to the racial disparity in the location of LULU's).
55. Even where there have been clear disparities in the location of such facilities, it has
been difficult to provide "statistically significant" evidence of disparate impact because of the
fact that relatively few facilities exist. See Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 677; East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 88587 (M.D. Ga.), affid, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir.), opinion replaced by 846 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir.
1989); R.LS.E., Inc, 768 F. Supp. at 1149.
56. Noting the increasing social and economic deterioration of the Black working class
and lower income communities, the rise of drugs and violence, and the proliferation of singleheaded households beginning in the mid- 1980's, Manning Marable explains the nature of modem racial subordination in the following terms:
The irony of these new realities was that the latest structures of domination no longer
assumed the classical form of "Jim Crow" racial segregation. No [government official] would dare utter the term "niggers." No corporate official, moving his firm's
productive resources and jobs out of the inner city, would justify economic divestment in crudely racist terms. Blacks, Hispanics and other people of color were being
more thoroughly oppressed in economic, political, social and educational institutions, without being stigmatized specifically in "racial" terms. This paradox of desegregation in the 1980s and early 1990s meant that black oppression was more
systematic and sophisticated than before, and that only a fragile elite had been
granted opportunities and privileges the white middle class had long taken for
granted.
MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM AND REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION IN

BLACK AMERICA, 1945-1990, at x (1991).
57. Charles Lawrence explains this best when he says:
Traditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions about racial matters
are influenced in large part by factors that can be characterized as neither intentional-in the sense that certain outcomes are self-consciously sought-nor unintentional-in the sense that the outcomes are random, fortuitous, and uninfluenced by
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the historical and social contexts that influence discriminatory outcomes
and create structures and institutions that continually reinforce those
outcomes. As Gerald Torres aptly explains, "the term racism draws its
contemporary moral strength by being clearly identified with the history
of the structural oppression of African-Americans and other people of
5
color in this society."

8

Though the totality of the essays in Race and the Incidence can be
read as an acknowledgement of the "institutional understanding" of environmental outcomes,59 the essays in general fail to articulate coherently
what exactly is at work when we refer to environmental racism. Michael
Gelobter's essay 6° is the one notable exception. Gelobter explains that
discriminatory outcomes in the environmental context rarely result solely
from inherently discriminatory environmental rules or the "prejudiced"
behavior of individuals within government institutions, such as EPA. 6 1
Instead, Gelobter asserts that "[d]iscriminatory outcomes should.., be
seen as the interaction of internal processes, external structures, and
'62
wider ideological and historical contexts and understandings.
Understanding environmental racism, Gelobter argues, requires a
framework that retains a broader structural view of economic and social
forces in influencing discriminatory outcomes, while isolating the dynamics within environmental bureaucracies that also contribute to such outcomes. 63 Traditional economic theory, Gelobter explains, relies on
market dynamics to explain discriminatory environmental outcomes.
That theory rationalizes that the poor, less able to buy in cleaner areas,
end up living in areas with poor environmental quality. 64 A realistic
analysis of structural processes, he argues, will include an analysis of social forces that drive markets and bureaucracies. Factors both external
to environmental enforcement agencies, such as demographic changes
and the locational patterns of polluters, and internal to those agencies,
such as patterns of environmental regulation, enforcement, and implethe decisionmaker's beliefs, desires and wishes.... We do not recognize the ways in
which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about race or the occasions
on which those beliefs affect our actions. In other words, a large part of the behavior
that produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation.
Lawrence, supra note 48, at 322.
58. Torres, supra note 47, at 839.
59. Cole, supra note 41, at 643 (explaining that, in contrast to the model that seeks to
identify and punish individual bad actors, the institutional model identifies polluters "not as
explanations themselves, but merely as part of an overall system centered on maximizing
profit"); see also Bullard, supra note 11, at 92 (acknowledging a link between institutional
racism's effect on the quality of life in minority communities and exposure to environmental
hazards in those communities).
60. Gelobter, supra note 10.
61. Id. at 64, 73.
62. Id. at 74.
63. Id. at 76.
64. Id.
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mentation, should undoubtedly inform a concept of environmental
65
racism.
To appreciate the meaning of environmental racism, then, one must
acknowledge the institutionalization of unconscious biases, exclusionary
processes, and normative judgments that influence racially meaningful
social structures, which in turn manifest racially disparate outcomes.
The historical racism that influences these processes and structures is antecedent to the effects produced by those structures and exposes forces
that are already at work. There is no distinct phenomenon of environmental racism, if seen as a manifestation of historical racism and antecedent structural forces influenced by that racism. Environmental racism
is thus less prescriptive and more descriptive of forces that manifest
themselves in racially disparate outcomes in hazardous environmental
exposure. In that sense, "environmental" not only modifies "racism,"
but ultimately corroborates it.
B.

The Resulting Abyss

The failure to provide a cogent theoretical understanding and documentation of the relationship between historical racism, antecedent
structural forces influenced by that racism, and racially disparate outcomes in hazardous environmental exposure leads to two consequences.
Both consequences are epitomized in EPA's Environmental Equity report. First, the disproportionate environmental burdens borne by people
of color are attributed to the very factors that are part and parcel of the
phenomenon of environmental racism. A second consequence quickly
follows from the first: institutional abdication of responsibility and concomitant claims of innocence.
For instance, EPA concludes that air pollution is "primarily an ur' '66
ban phenomenon, where emission densities tend to be the highest.
The Agency acknowledges studies demonstrating that African-Americans are shown to have higher levels of carbon monoxide in their blood
than Whites and that poor minorities tend to have higher levels of nitrogen dioxide in their blood. 67 However, it attributes this outcome to the
fact that "[a] large proportion of racial minorities reside in metropolitan
areas and [therefore] may be systematically exposed to higher levels of
' 68
certain air pollutants."
Similarly, in reviewing one study that concluded that Hispanic
mothers had higher levels of certain pesticides in their milk, EPA criticized the study's failure to adjust for "the fact that most Hispanic
mothers were from the Southwest, where pesticide use tends to be
65.
66.
67.
68.

See id. at 77-80.
ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY, supra note 2, at 13.
ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY SUPPORTING DOCUMENT, supra note 2, at 11.
ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY, supra note 2, at 13.
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higher."' 69 It concluded that a review of the research indicates that
"since racial and ethnic minorities comprise the majority of the documented and undocumented farm workforce, they may experience higher
than average risk from agricultural chemicals."' 70 Likewise, the report
attributes the disparity in exposure to contaminated fish consumption
among racial and ethnic groups to the fact that "some populations...
and some cultural groups consume much more fish than the average population."'71 Higher minority exposure to pollution from toxic waste sites
is similarly attributed to the fact that "minorities are more likely to live
near a commercial or uncontrolled hazardous waste site" than nonminorities.7 2 Thus, according to EPA, "[i]t is becoming increasingly apparent that a person's activity pattern is the single most important
73
determinant of environmental exposures for most pollutants.
EPA's conclusions invite a kind of circular reasoning that suggests
that race, historical patterns, and present "choices" of residence, employment, and diet are only coincidentally related. In making the connection
between behavior and exposure, EPA is quick to resort to "victim blaming" 74 and to proclaim its relative "innocence" in safeguarding the public

from uncontrolled exposure to environmental hazards. 75 In doing so, the
Agency shows no appreciation, or acknowledgment, for the social con69. ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY SUPPORTING DOCUMENT, supra note 2, at 10.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 12; see also Minority Anglers, supra note 11, at 110 (finding that Native Americans consumed 36% more fish and African-Americans 13% more fish than the White
population).
72. ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY SUPPORTING DOCUMENT, supra note 2, at 7.
73. Id. EPA drew a distinction between "actual" and "potential" exposure from environmental hazards and pollutants. "Potential" exposures represent the "environmental measurements" in air, water, soil, or food. ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY, supra note 2, at 13. For
instance, "the level of outdoor air pollution in a particular community is a measure of the
potential exposure for the residents." Id. "Actual" exposure, on the other hand, is said to
depend on a multitude of behavioral and societal factors as well as biological susceptibility.
ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY SUPPORTING DOCUMENT, supra note 2, at 14. EPA concluded
that people of color may have greater "potential" exposure to some pollutants because they
tend to live in urban areas, are more likely to live near a waste site, or exhibit a greater tendency to rely on subsistence fishing. ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY, supra note 2, at 12.
74. "Victim blaming" may be defined as attributing to either bad habits or genetics the
higher incidence of environmental injuries to minority persons. See Wright, supra note 11, at
118.
75. This victim-blaming response to discriminatory outcomes has been criticized in the

employment context. See, e.g., Vicki Shultz, Telling Stories about Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretationsof Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of
Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1754 (1990) (criticizing a district court's interpretation of sex segregation in employment in EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp.
1264 (N.D. II1. 1986), affd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988), as the expression of women's
choice). In response to claims of race and sex discrimination, employers have asserted the
"lack of interest" defense as an explanation for disparate outcomes in hiring minorities and
women in certain jobs. That explanation posits that women and/or minorities lack interest in,
or do not choose, certain jobs instead of being excluded from certain jobs because of their sex
or race. Id.
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text and structural dynamics that influence the choices, mobility, and
employment of people of color? 6 By taking the current research at its
word, that environmental racism is inherent in the disparate exposure
rates, EPA was able to attribute the outcomes to the very social factors
that influence those outcomes. In doing so, EPA dissociated itself from
the structural and social context in which it exists.
Environmental racism can be said to be a manifestation of the effects
of discriminatory housing and real estate policies and practices, residential segregation and limited residential choices influenced by such discrimination, discriminatory zoning regulations and ineffective land use
polices, racial disparities in the availability of jobs and municipal services, imbalances in political access and power, and "white flight" from
cities that has created racially homogenous suburbs and impoverished
cities. 77 Consequently, as Robert Bullard explains, "[a]lthough the effects of pollution have no geographic boundaries, blacks and lower income groups are often 'trapped' in polluted environments" because of the
very factors discussed above. 78 This is true even where the demographics
of that community were vastly different at the time the neighborhood or
geographic area first became polluted. 79 Coupled with government bu76. In reviewing early (1967-71) race discrimination cases that rejected the "lack of interest" explanation for the disproportionate number of minorities in the lowest-paid, most menial
jobs, Vicki Shultz recounts the federal courts' approach to analyzing the employment
"choices" of minorities. That approach presumed that continuing patterns of racial segregation were attributable not to minorities' independent preferences for lower-paying, less-challenging jobs, but rather to historical labor market discrimination that inevitably influenced
minority job aspirations and opportunities and created racial disadvantage in the labor market.
Shultz, supra note 75, at 1771-75. A core assumption of this approach is that choices do not
exist in a vacuum and that institutions do not operate apart from the social forces that influence individual choices: "By acknowledging that people's work aspirations and identities are
shaped in the context of what larger institutional and legal environments define as possible,
early courts refused to allow employers to escape responsibility for the collective history of
labor market discrimination by pinning the blame on its victims." Id. at 1775.
77. See, e.g., Bullard, supra note 11, at 92, 95. Bullard notes that:
The end result of the nation's apartheid-type policies on black households has meant
limited mobility, reduced housing options and residential packages, and decreased
environmental choices. For example, air pollution in inner-city neighborhoods can be
found at levels up to five times greater than those found in suburban areas. Urban
areas, in general, have "dirtier air and drinking water, more waste water and solid
waste problems, and greater exposure to lead and other heavy metals than non-urban
areas."
Id. at 92 (quoting RICHARD KAZIS & RICHARD L. GROSSMAN, FEAR AT WORK: JOB BLACKMAIL, LABOR, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 48 (1982)).
78. Bullard, supra note 11, at 94-95.
79. See, e.g., Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor & Poisoned: Minority
GrassrootsEnvironmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69, 6970 (1991). The authors note that there are typically three patterns giving rise to the disproportionate location of sources of toxic pollution in poor minority enclaves, all attributable to various developmental patterns:
In some cases, the residential communities where poor minorities now live were originally the homes of whites who worked in the facilities that generate toxic emissions.
The housing and the industry sprang up roughly simultaneously. Whites vacated the
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reaucracies' lack of enforcement and compliance with environmental
protection laws, 80 environmental racism reflects less the dynamics of a
"free" market, and more the institutional and structural forces that contribute to the subordination of people of color.
Existing research and discourse about the phenomenon of environmental racism, however, stop far short of articulating and providing a
coherent epistemological understanding of how and why racially disparate environmental outcomes, so well-documented in numerous studies,
are a manifestation of the history of the structural oppression of people of
color in this society. Indeed, environmental problems are intertwined
with, and are simply another manifestation of, other social, economic,
and political ills that continue to befall poor people of color in this society.8 1 Moving beyond the constraining construction of what is recognizable as racism, primarily molded by shifting judicial concepts of that
doctrine, requires bridging the conceptual gap between disparate racial
outcomes and the structural forces that virtually dictate those outcomes.
Until the discourse and research fill this gap, we will not truly understand "the pervasiveness and persistence of racism despite changes at the
82
institutional and individual levels in the past twenty years."
housing (but not necessarily the jobs) for better shelter as their socioeconomic status
improved, and poorer black and brown folk who enjoy much less residential mobility
took their place. In other cases, housing for blacks and Latinos was built in the
vicinity of existing industrial operations because the land was cheap and the people
were poor .... In yet a third pattern, sources of toxic pollution were placed in existing minority communities. The explanations for such sitings are numerous; some
of them reflect the impact of racial and ethnic discrimination. The impact, of course,
may be attenuated and less than obvious.
Id.
80. See, e.g., Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection:The RacialDivide in
EnvironmentalLaw, NAT'L L.J., Sep. 21, 1992, at S1, S2. That study concluded that there is a
racial disparity in the way the U.S. government cleans up toxic waste sites and punishes polluters. Id. Specifically, it found that White communities see faster cleanup action, better results, and stiffer penalties than communities where Blacks, Hispanics, and other minorities
live. Id. It also found that racial disparities occurred regardless of whether the communities
were wealthy or poor. Id.
81. For instance, exposure to hazardous chemicals can result from the type of
work/occupational environments that poor people of color occupy. Poor and racial minorities
most often occupy the most dangerous workplace jobs, Wright, supra note 11, at 124, perhaps
because of the lack of educational and economic opportunities available to them. For instance,
studies show that working conditions within certain industries where people of color are more
likely to be employed contribute to a high incidence of stress-related mortality and morbidity.
Id. at 117. See also Perfecto, supra note 11, at 178, 180 (noting that farmworkers suffer the
most from exposure to pesticides and that 90% of farmworkers in the United States are ethnic
minorities with 75% being Latinos).
82. Gelobter, supra note 10, at 74.
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III
ASSESSING AND ADDRESSING THE HARM OF
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM

Traditionally, the civil rights movement has not embraced environmental degradation issues and their resulting health hazards as a concern. 83 Instead, the civil rights movement has focused on securing for
racial minorities the same basic rights to social goods, such as educational and employment opportunities, housing accommodations, economic development, and political participation, as those shared by
nonminorities. 84 The environmental movement, in contrast, has focused
on the human health and ecological effects of degradation in air and
water quality, pesticide use, and degraded landscapes. 85 By focusing on
environmental conservation issues to the exclusion of other social concerns such as poverty, the environmental movement has been criticized
for "[viewing] problems in racial minority communities as an unwelcome
stepchild."

8 6

A.

Environmental and Civil Rights Paradigms

Given the traditionally diverging concerns of the two respective
movements, the environmental and civil rights paradigms present different approaches and limitations for assessing and addressing the harm of
environmental racism. The civil rights paradigm conceptualizes harm as
a right's deprivation or violation.8 7 The essence of harm assessment
under this paradigm is comparative, determining whether an individual
has been denied rights shared by others solely on the basis of group membership. 8 The denial of such rights has been statutorily and judicially
constructed as an individual, as opposed to group, deprivation. 89
83. Lee, supra note 4, at 20; Taylor, supra note 11, at 28.
84. Lee, supra note 4, at 20.
85. See Taylor, supra note 11, at 31.
86. Lee, supra note 4, at 20.
87. Civil rights laws thus prohibit the denial of civil rights, such as jobs or voting, on the
basis of race or other impermissible characteristics. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a to 2000e-17 (West 1981 & Supp. 1993) (outlawing discrimination in places
of public accommodation and in employment on basis of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988) (outlawing denial or abridgement
of the right to vote on account of race or color).
88. This "antidiscrimination" approach focuses on individual acts of discrimination, or
deprivation of rights, by an alleged perpetrator. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-21, at 1515, 1519 (2nd ed. 1988) ("Discrimination is an 'act based on
prejudice,' and its essential elements are therefore a factor and decision based on invidious
rather than rational grounds."). See generally Freeman, supra note 49 (describing and explaining Supreme Court racial discrimination decisions).
89. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that employers must
not fail or refuse to hire, or discharge, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of an individual's race, color, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a) (1988). An employer is
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Another version of harm within the civil rights paradigm is the right
not to be subordinated. 90 This theory holds that "[t]he Constitution may
be offended not only by individual acts of racial discrimination, but also
by government rules, policies or practices that perennially reenforce the
subordinate status of any group." 9 1 Within the civil rights paradigm,
then, the harm of environmental racism can be either the denial of a right
to a clean environment shared by others or the right not to bear a dispro92
portionate burden of environmental hazards.
Central to assessing a harm in the civil rights paradigm, is the element of causation. The civil rights paradigm will only recognize a right's
deprivation where it can be shown that the harm was caused by the alleged perpetrator. 93 As noted in part II, the requirement of causation
has proven to be fatal to environmental harm claims within this parafurther forbidden to classify applicants or employees in any way that would tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities because of such individual's race, color, sex, or
national origin. Id. Likewise, the Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted to prohibit
government from allocating societal benefits and burdens to individuals on the basis of "suspect" classifications, such as race, absent a compelling governmental reason. See, e.g., Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986). The U.S. Supreme Court has recently
reiterated that rights created by the Equal Protection Clause have been held to be guaranteed
to the individual. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (citing
Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)).
90. See MARABLE, supra note 56, at 187 (civil rights movement's goals were "the elimination of social, political, legal and economic barriers that forced black Americans into a
subordinate status"); TRIBE, supra note 88, § 16-21 (describing antisubjugation theme in equal
protection jurisprudence that aims to break down legally created or legally reenforced systems
of subordination that treat some people as second class citizens; the principle is more concerned with the burdens government action imposes on suspect groups than with what
prejudices lurk in the hearts and minds of government actors).
91. TRIBE, supra note 88, § 16-21 (citing the "group-disadvantaging principle" set forth
by Owen M. Fiss in Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108,
147-56 (1976)). Group-disadvantaging theories of harm, however, have been soundly rejected
by the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (holding that the
rights established by the Equal Protection Clause are personal rights and are not dependent
upon the racial group the individual belongs to).
92. See Introduction,supra note 7, at 6; Bullard, supra note 11, at 91 ("Documentation of
civil rights violations has strengthened the move to make environmental quality a basic right of
all individuals.").
93. For instance, under Title VII, acts of racial discrimination must be identified with
particularity and those acts must be attributable to the fault of the employer. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k) (Supp. III 1991); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989).
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) shifted the
burden of justifying the employment practice established in Wards Cove from the plaintiff to
the employer, it retained the requirement of causation. The statute provides that disparate
impact is established by a demonstration that the employer uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact and the employer fails to prove that the challenged practice
is both "job related" and consistent with "business necessity." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k)(I)(A)(i); see also Freeman, supra note 51, at 1409-13 (describing this as the victim/perpetrator approach whereby civil rights laws have been interpreted such that violations
occur only where "actions of identifiable perpetrators ... have purposely and intentionally
caused harm to identifiable victims").
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digm. 94 Thus, seemingly subordinate social conditions, such as the disproportionate environmental hazard exposure borne by racial minorities,
do not constitute presumptive harms within the civil rights paradigm,
absent an identifiable link to a responsible perpetrator. 9 5
In the environmental paradigm, harm is the health loss resulting
from environmental degradation and contamination. Harm is measured
and conceptualized in the environmental paradigm in terms of a scientifically measurable link between exposure to dangerous chemicals and actual health effects. The harm of environmental racism in the
environmental paradigm consists of the multiple health problems, including lowered life expectancy rates and increased disease rates, of people of
color 96 that result from the disproportionate exposure to environmental
hazards. It is within this paradigm that EPA, in its Environmental Eq'97
uity report, examines the question of environmental "equity.
Like the civil rights paradigm, the requirement of causation is fatal
to a finding of harm in the environmental paradigm. No harm is said to
have occurred unless there is a demonstrable link between the exposure
of an environmental hazard and a probable loss, assessed solely in terms
of health consequences or death. 98 In assessing the existence of harm
94. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text. The requirements of causation and
intent have "reduced (antidiscrimination law] to the status of another intentional tort, albeit
one with unusually strict intent and causation requirements." Freeman, supra note 51, at
1431. The causation requirement has also been fatal to the compensation of victims in toxic
tort litigation:
In considering compensation .... there are really two causation problems. One is the
problem of establishing that the chemical involved is capable of causing the type of
harm from which the plaintiff suffers. This is often difficult because the causation of
diseases like cancer is so poorly understood.... Many toxic substances are relatively
novel, and, given the long latency periods associated with cancer, sufficient evidence
concerning health effects is not likely to be available for the foreseeable future....
The other problem relating to proof of causation is that of establishing, given that the
toxic substance in question can cause harm of the type suffered by the plaintiff, that
the plaintiff's harm did in fact result from such exposure .... The statistical association between exposure and illness may be too weak to justify a finding that a particular plaintiff's disease is causally linked to an exposure to a hazardous substance.
Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1227-28 (1987); see also Robert L.
Rabin, Environmental Liability and the Tort System, 24 Hous. L. REV. 27 (1987) (stating that
the tort system is severely tested by toxic tort litigation, because identification of the cause of a
toxic harm is a costly enterprise that relies on types of evidence and probability judgements
that can be regarded as ill-suited to traditional resolution through the adversary process).
95. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986) (rejecting societal race
discrimination as too amorphous to remedy; plaintiff must show prior identified discrimination
by governmental actor involved); see also City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 498-99.
96. ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY SUPPORTING DOCUMENT, supra note 2, at 4.
97. The Agency prefers the term "equity," instead of justice, to refer to the "distribution
and effects of environmental problems and the policies and processes to reduce differences in
who bears environmental risks." ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY, supra note 2, at 10. It chose
"environmental equity" because "it most readily lends itself to scientific risk analysis." Id.
98. EPA acknowledges the difficulty of establishing a causal connection between hazardous environmental exposures and health effects and that attempts to do so are fraught with
uncertainty:
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arising from racially disproportionate environmental hazard exposure,
EPA effectively concluded that, though there is sufficient evidence that
racial minority groups experience disproportionate exposures to various
environmental hazards and that there exist clear differences between racial groups in terms of disease and death rates, no harm has occurred to
racial minority communities because there has been no demonstrable scientific link between the exposures and the health problems in those
communities. 9 9
Unlike civil rights law, however, environmental law regulates well
below the level of harm. While the civil rights paradigm is remedial in
nature, the environmental paradigm is preventative in nature. Because of
its remedial nature, the civil rights paradigm inherently dictates that a
harm first occur before redress is available. The remedial nature of the
civil rights paradigm thus renders it inadequate to address the multidimensional harms00 of environmental racism. Unlike the loss of employment or educational opportunities, for instance, health losses arising
from a polluted environment are not so easily remediable.
Environmental law and policy, by contrast, are primarily geared towards protecting the environment from various pollutants and the prevention of health losses. Environmental law seeks to protect both the
physical environment and prevent human health losses by controlling exposure to environmental hazards before harm has occurred. It does so
by assessing the risk of harm from a given substance and then setting
acceptable levels of risk that provide ample margins of safety to protect
human health.10 ' Thus, unlike the civil rights paradigm, which waits for
a harm to occur, the environmental paradigm seeks to prevent harm
from occurring.
First, the etiology of many diseases has not been fully elaborated. Second, most diseases to which environmental exposures may contribute have a plethora of possible
causes. People are also routinely exposed to a vast array of environmental agentsfew of which are quantified. Fourth, the latency period for health effects from longterm, low-level exposures may be 20 years or more. Fifth, environmental pollutants
may cause multiple health effects. Finally, a single health effect may result from
multiple exposures.
ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY SUPPORTING DOCUMENT, supra note 2, at 14.
99. In drawing its conclusion, EPA made a distinction between "exposure" and "health
effects." The Agency was careful to note that "[e]xposure is not the same as actual health
effects .... " ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY, supra note 2, at 13. Thus, "exposure" to dangerous
chemicals alone is not tantamount to the environmental conception of harm because of "the
difficulty of establishing a causal relationship between health effects and environmental exposures .... ." ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY SUPPORTING DOCUMENT, supra note 2, at 14. The
one "notable exception" to this finding is harm caused by lead poisoning. The Agency found
sufficient data linking disparate exposure to lead, differences in disease and death rates, and
adverse health effects. According to the Agency, the data is "unambiguous: a higher percentage of Black children than White children have high [enough] blood lead levels" to cause
adverse health effects. ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY, supra note 2, at 11.
100. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 307(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (1988);
Clean Air Act § 109(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
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In structuring environmental laws' regulatory priorities to prevent
future harms arising from environmental hazard exposure, risk is evaluated in two steps. The first step, risk "assessment, ....
provides an estimate of the probability that human exposure to a chemical agent will
result in an adverse health effect to the exposed individual, or an estimate
of the incidence of the effect within an exposed population."'10 2 This assessment is governed almost exclusively by the "scientific understanding
of risk."' 1 3 The second step is risk "management": officials make decisions regarding acceptable levels of exposure and risk, as well as the appropriate agency response. 0 4 It is in the risk management process where
factors other than human health risk, such as efficiency and equity, are
considered.' 0 5
Because environmental law regulates well below the level of harm
and is preventative, it is better suited to address the multidimensional
harms of environmental racism. In theory, its hybrid, scientific policy
form of risk evaluation is a recognition that policy decisions play important roles in resolving scientific uncertainties when the ultimate decisions
are made about how best to manage environmental harms. 106 However,
the practical application of the risk evaluation process exposes its limitations in addressing the harms of environmental racism. These limitations
reveal themselves in EPA's reluctance-in its report-to consider harms,
other than health losses, arising from environmental racism.
Using the concept of "scientific risk" for the dual purpose of providing "the theoretical basis and the mechanism for achieving equitable environmental protection,"' 1 7 EPA rejected considering the very social
factors and harms that it claims could be incorporated in its risk manage102.

ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY SUPPORTING DOCUMENT, supra note 2, at 30.

103. The risk assessment process has been criticized for some of the same reasons that
EPA found it difficult to establish a causal connection between disproportionate exposure of
racial minorities to environmental hazards and their disproportionately low health status.
That is, that scientific risk assessments do not, and cannot, reliably calculate expected losses
because, in part, "our understanding of causal mechanisms-such as physiological, toxicological or ecological processes-often seems plagued by uncertainties." Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming EnvironmentalLaw: A Normative Critique of ComparativeRisk Analysis, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 562, 571-73 (1992); see also Mary L. Lyndon, Risk Assessment, Risk Communication
and Legitimacy: An Introduction to the Symposium, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 289, 291 (1989);
Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Not so Paradoxical The Rationalefor TechnologyBased Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729, 731-32 (noting the uncertainties and inconclusiveness
of risk assessments); Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment,
5 YALE J. ON REG. 89 (1988) (noting arbitrary judgment calls in EPA's risk assessments of
airborne benzene).
104.

105.

supra note 2, at 30.
As EPA explains: "The factors considered in the risk management phase range from
ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY SUPPORTING DOCUMENT,

social concerns to economic concerns, from acceptance by the communities affected to technical feasibility. There is an opportunity to consider relevant environmental equity issues during
the risk management process." Id.
106. Hornstein, supra note 103, at 579 n.3.
107. ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY, supra note 2, at 9.
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ment process. For instance, aside from health problems, the presence of
environmental hazards in communities of color has been documented to
cause psychological stress resulting from feelings of disorientation and
apprehension about future effects and loss of community cohesion, 10 8 as
well as socioeconomic damage resulting from the loss of businesses,
homes, and schools. Because EPA believes that "[t]he distribution of
environmental risks is often [scientifically] measurable and quantifiable,"
it has made clear that it can only "act on inequities based on scientific
data." 10 9 It avoids responsibility for other types of harms, claiming that
"[e]valuating the existence of injustices and racism is more difficult because they take into account socioeconomic factors . . ,-."11o
B.

Beyond Myopia

The environmental paradigm of risk assessment and harm prevention leaves the phenomenon of environmental racism in a conceptual predicament. On the one hand, the disproportionate exposure of racial
minorities to environmental hazards does not constitute the equivalent of
environmental harm, because of the lack of a scientifically measurable
link between disproportionate hazards exposure and adverse health effects."
On the other hand, the scientific myopia of the environmental
paradigm leaves little room to assess the multidimensional harms that
can result from environmental racism.
Environmentalists must ultimately accept some guidance from the
civil rights paradigm's assessment of the harms arising from environmental racism. To do this, they must first acknowledge that their current
paradigm represents one set of normative values and objectives in measuring environmental harms, such as economic efficiency and utilitarian112
ism, while ignoring others, such as equity and social justice concerns.
108. White, supra note 11, at 129; see also Richard Lewis, Comment, Destruction of Community, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 365, 365-67 (1986) (describing loss of community as the loss of
neighbors, homes, schools, churches, and businesses that results in collective trauma to a
group's identity); R. George Wright, Hazardous Waste Disposal and the Problems of Stigmatic
and RacialInjury, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 777, 785 (1991) (noting that residents near toxic sites may
feel degraded because their community is a dumping ground).
109. ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY, supra note 2, at 10.
I10.

Id.

111. For example, the full extent of harmful exposure to pesticides is unknown because, in
part, less than 10% of pesticide products in use have been tested for potential health effects by
EPA. Perfecto, supra note 11, at 180, 186. It has also been estimated that, of 600 registered
pesticide active ingredients, EPA can provide full safety assurance for only six. Id. at 180.
112. See Joseph P. Tomain, DistributionalConsequencesof Environmental Regulation:Economics, Politics,and Environmental Policymaking, I KAN. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 101, 110 (1991)
(arguing that cost-benefit analysis is deficient because it obscures sociopolitical norms); Hornstein, supra note 103, at 594-95 (stating that ignoring equity concerns in the risk assessment
process not only masks the full dimensions of environmental harms, but also prevents environmental protection decisionmakers from making more complete risk analyses and assessments
that take into account our varied social values).
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Environmentalists must also recognize that the environmental paradigm
is constrained in how it assesses and addresses harm because it focuses on
aggregate population harm in an effort to achieve the most economically
1 13
efficient prevention of that harm.
The civil rights paradigm's focus on the comparative status of different populations in assessing harm can inform the environmental risk
management process. By considering the group characteristics of communities that bear disproportionate risk, the environmental paradigm
could more appropriately balance the delicate social and political decisions in regards to who bears what environmental risks and at what societal costs. 11 4 Incorporating social justice or equity principles could mean
that the environmental paradigm's assessment of harm would "reflect
and define our [societal] values, and not simply count how many of us
will suffer." 15
Despite the shortcomings of EPA's assessment of the harms of environmental racism, its recommendations should be encouraging to environmental justice advocates. For instance, it recommends collecting
environmental exposure data by race and income, revising its risk assessment process to consider high risk populations, and identifying and
targeting opportunities to reduce high concentrations of risk to specific
population groups.' 6 Whether these recommendations will be followed
113. See generally Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 1393 (1981) (discussing the economic efficiency model underlying environmental law and
policymaking); Hornstein, supra note 103, at 566 (stating that current risk assessment model
arises out of, and reflects, the economic efficiency paradigm by assessing whether the societal
costs of some regulatory efforts are worth their relatively small benefits in risk reduction); id.
at 594 (noting that the risk assessment model emphasizes one attribute-aggregate effects on
an entire population-and views choices based on comparisons of that single attribute as the
presumptively "correct" approach).
114. As one commentator suggests, this would mean taking into account the effect of environmental exposure on individual communities. Simply put, the risk management process
would have to account for the equities and inequities in risk-bearing. Hornstein, supra note
103, at 593. Hornstein uses the following example to illustrate his point: suppose that exposure to chlorine in public drinking water systems causes an estimated 400 excess cancers nationwide and air and water pollution from active waste sites cause no more than 100 excess
cancers annually:
For the "hard" comparative risk analyst, the evaluation of these risks is simple arithmetic: 400 cancers are worse than 100.... Yet, after incorporating considerations of
equity, a perfectly plausible case can be made that the risks posed by [hazardous
waste sites] are 'worse' than the risks posed by chlorine by-products in water: the ex
ante chances of developing cancer from [hazardous waste sites] are concentrated on
relatively few individuals rather than widely shared over the general population; the
ex post distribution of actual cancers from [hazardous waste sites] is similarly concentrated, and unlike the case of low-level chlorine use, includes the heightened risk
of destroying whole families or neighborhoods; and the cancer risks from [hazardous
waste sites] are disproportionate in relation to the (indirect) benefits from hazardous
chemical use enjoyed by the few risk-bearers.
Id.
115. Id.
116. ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY, supra note 2, at 26-28.
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by the Agency remains to be seen. However, such recommendations at
least symbolize an effort by environmentalists to move beyond the scientific myopia of current harm assessment.
Likewise, civil rights advocates should heed the limitations of the
civil rights paradigm (primarily judicially imposed) and consider the advantages of the environmental paradigm for preventing harm. Because
the environmental paradigm lacks the remedial and causation constraints
imposed upon the civil rights paradigm, it has greater potential to
achieve environmental justice by preventing further harms in communities that are already burdened by multiple injustices, which contribute to
their subordinate status in society. The quest for environmental justice
will ultimately require that civil rights advocates and environmentalists
bridge the differences between the two paradigms by heeding their limitations and embracing their advantages.
IV
THE QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: BEYOND
DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS

That environmental decisionmaking and regulation are essentially
political, rather than exclusively technical or analytical processes, has
been persuasively argued by many environmentalists. 1 7 Not surprisingly, much of the response to the phenomenon of environmental racism
has been political in nature and at the grassroots level. Environmental
justice advocates believe that disproportionate environmental health risks
are inextricably linked to the political economy of place, where
"[p]olitical power and economic clout are also key factors which influence the spatial distribution of residential amenities and disamenities
....
1118 Although lawsuits have been brought to challenge the disparate
impact of siting decisions, under both constitutional and statutory theories of race discrimination, 1 9 environmental justice advocates increasingly view environmental hazards exposures as inherently political, not
legal, problems. 120 As Luke Cole has argued, because "someone in the
117. See, e.g., MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 17, 26-29 (1988); Daniel A. Farber, Environmentalism, Economics and
the Public Interest, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1043 (1989) (reviewing Sagoffs book and noting
that he correctly concludes that cost-benefit analysis is misused to provide technocratic solutions to fundamentally political questions); Tomain, supra note 112, at 110 ("[P]ublic policy
issues, because of their normative content, do not have objectively verifiable and scientifically
correct answers. Instead the resolution of [such issues] depends on a legitimate and politically
acceptable decision-making process.").
118. Robert Bullard & Beverly H. Wright, Environmentalism and the Politics of Equity:
Emergent Trends in the Black Community, in MID-AM. REV. SOC., Winter 1987, at 21, 25; see
also Introduction, supra note 7, at 7.
119. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
120. See Luke W. Cole, Correspondence, Remedies for Environmental Racism: A View
From the Field, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1991, 1995-97 (1992). But see Rachel D. Godsil, Note,
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government has decided to allow a company to dump in their neighbor12 1
hood," what is required to change that decision is a "political tool.'
The political tool often utilized to affect such change is "a communitybased movement to bring pressure on the person or agency making the
decision." 122 Community activism "[empowers] local residents to defend
their space and develop a political base to influence [environmental] deci123
sion making."
The grassroots activism that has dominated community-based efforts to seek environmental justice has been primarily outcome-focused.
Activists seek to change the outcome of decisions made about the distribution of an environmental hazard through protests and other confrontational strategies. 124 In what has turned out to be strikingly similar to the
"NIMBY" syndrome, partially said to blame for the racially disparate
exposure rates, 125 racial minority communities have organized nationwide to resist sitings of hazardous waste facilities. 126 This type of response to the phenomenon of environmental racism resonates with the
distributive model of justice reflected in the writings of philosophers such
as John Rawls.127 Rawls' "difference principle," for example, would allocate social goods so as to result in the greatest benefit (or least burden)
to the least advantaged social classes. 128 Recent legislation, such as the
proposed Environmental Justice Act of 1992,129 also echoes this model of
justice and Rawls' difference principle. That Act would limit further siting of toxic chemical facilities in environmental high impact areas if it is
shown that adverse human health consequences have resulted from the
level of toxic emissions in those areas as compared to other areas. 30 A
Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 394, 421-27 (1991) (proposing federal
legislation to ameliorate environmental racism).
121. Cole, supra note 41, at 648.
122. Id.
123. Bullard, supra note 11, at 93. These efforts have also resulted in the creation of coalitions with other mainstream environmental groups as well as the formation of separate minority environmental groups and organizations that deal exclusively with environmental issues
pertaining to communities of color. See generally Taylor, supra note 11.
124. In recounting the historical origins of community activism around this issue, Mohai
and Bryant describe this model: "One of the first highly visible struggles took place in Warren
County, North Carolina, where both blacks and whites strategically placed their bodies in
front of trucks to prevent them from carrying soil laced with PCBs to a landfill located in a
predominantly black area." Introduction, supra note 7, at 2. Robert Bullard notes that
"[a]lthough the protests were unsuccessful in halting the landfill construction, they marked the
first time blacks mobilized a nationally broad-based group to protest environmental inequities." Bullard, supra note 11, at 91.
125. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 4, at 16-18 (describing several examples of successful community activism against the siting of hazardous waste facilities).

127. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A

THEORY OF JUSTICE

(1971).

128. See id. at 75.
129. H.R. 5326, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
130. Id. § 403. The Act defines "environmental high impact areas" as the "100 counties
with the highest total weight of toxic chemicals present during the course of the most recent 5-
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core assumption of the distributive model is that fair outcomes are coextensive with justice.
The distributive model of justice, however, is limited in its ability to
attain justice in the environmental context, particularly if disparate environmental outcomes are seen as reflecting institutional and structural racism. In other words, if discriminatory environmental outcomes result
from, for instance, institutional decisions influenced by unconscious racism, then purely distributive responses will fail to address the roots of
environmental racism. As philosopher Iris Marion Young has argued,
the distributive model "restricts the scope of justice" in that it focuses on
"the end-state pattern of persons and goods that appear on the social
field," rather than "decisionmaking power and procedures." 1 3 ' It thus
fails to "bring social structures and institutional contexts under evaluation." 132 The distributive model would fail if, for instance, toxic chemical facilities were distributed equitably among high and low impact areas,
but then racially disparate patterns of exposure were recreated due to
discriminatory housing and real estate practices, economic dislocation,
and/or voting behavior. 33 Moreover, because distributive justice myopically focuses on particular patterns of distributions at particular moments, it allows the reproduction of a regular distributive pattern over
time without ever understanding and evaluating the processes that produce that pattern. 134 Thus, like the oft-criticized economic efficiency and
expected utility responses to general environmental problems, distributive political responses to environmental equity problems focus too much
on outcomes and not enough on the processes that produce those
35
outcomes.1
Proponents of the distributional model of justice have made the argument that this model will expand the "NIMBY" principle to the
year period for which data is available." Id. § 101(2).
131.

IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 18, 20 (1990).

132. Id. at 20.
133. Such a scenario might look like this:
For example, assume that on a given date, all LULUs then needed were dispersed
"fairly" throughout society. Wealthier individuals would respond to the distribution
by moving away from LULUs. Consequently, sites located in wealthier areas would
eventually be surrounded by a ring of land deserted by wealthier families. The
LULU would cause property values in that ring to be lower than in surrounding
areas. The ring would then become a ghetto of lower income households. In short,
the pattern of disproportionate siting would be re-created.
Been, supra note 5 1, at 1018-19 (footnotes omitted). Been also notes the arguments and empirical evidence calling into question the likelihood of this particular scenario occurring.
134. YOUNG, supra note 131, at 29.
135. Choices are made, according to expected utility theory, based on an evaluation of the
outcomes such choices generate. Hornstein, supra note 103, at 577-78. Expected utility theory
underlies much of environmental decisionmaking in that "environmental problems are evaluated according to their expected losses in terms of cancer and noncancer health effects, effects
on human welfare .. .and effects on nonhuman species and ecological systems." Id.
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"NIABY" principle: "Not in Anybody's Backyard. ' 136 In other words,
the price of toxic waste disposal will rise to prohibitive levels because it
will eventually become too difficult to establish new sites for such facilities, thereby forcing industry to replace toxic inputs to their manufacturing processes in order to minimize the production of toxic waste. 37 By
preventing distribution of toxic wastes anywhere, a distributive model of
justice could result in justice for all, signaled by a move from pollution
"control" to pollution "prevention."'1 38 This argument is shortsighted in
that it does not take into account the intangible nature of many environmental hazards. Aside from hazardous waste facilities, the origins of environmental hazards exposure such as air pollution and contaminated
fish consumption are not as conducive to distributional solutions because
their sources can be so varied, numerous, and often unknown. 39 Thus,
distributive approaches to attaining justice or equity in the environmental context are generally ineffective because of the elusive nature of toxic
distribution.
Another aspect of grassroots activism is becoming more prominent
and is, I believe, better suited to achieve justice in the environmental
context. This type of activism is geared toward ensuring public partici-

pation in compiling, and access to, information critical to environmental
decisionmaking processes.14° By keeping decisionmaking processes con136. Cole, supra note 41, at 645 n.86.
137. Id. at 645.
138. Id.
139. As Robert Rabin explains in discussing the limited capacity of the tort system to
address environmental harms:
Frequently, environmental harm is a consequence of the aggregate risk created by a
considerable number of independently acting enterprises. It may be that the risk
generated by any single source is, in fact, inconsequential. . . . Acid rain,
chlorofluorocarbons, Agent Orange, and asbestos fibers ... [n]ot only are... potentially the source of widespread harm, but they are frequently produced by a vast
number of discrete enterprises .... Toxic substances evoke the special apprehensions
of unseen risks. They emanate from sources that are hard to identify.
Rabin, supra note 94, at 32.
140. One recent and prominent example of this is the success of one community in Kettleman City, California, in preventing the siting of a waste incinerator in a predominantly
Latino farming community of 1100 people. See Cole, supra note 41, at 675-77. Faced with a
proposal to place a toxic waste incinerator, residents organized a community group to fight the
proposal, held demonstrations, and pressured local officials. Id. at 674. Central to their opposition, however, was public participation in the planning and decisionmaking process. Specifically, this entailed translating the environmental impact report (EIR) on the proposed
incinerator from English to Spanish because most of the residents of the community were
Spanish-speaking. Id. at 675. Despite the county's refusal to translate the EIR into Spanish,
the community organized with environmental justice advocates to hold meetings and educate
themselves about the contents of the EIR. Id. The community generated 126 public comments on the EIR, 119 of them in Spanish, and submitted them to the county. Id. at 676.
Eventually, in the face of rigorous community opposition, the nation's biggest hazardous waste
disposal company eventually withdrew its application to build the incinerator four miles west
of the community, two years after the county's supervisors approved a use permit for the
incinerator. Dennis Pfaff, Enemies of Toxics IncineratorAre Cheered by End of Project, S.F.
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stantly in focus, this model of activism equates fair process with justice.
Such a focus on process could mean, as Daniel Farber has argued, that
environmental decisionmaking would value the independent significance
of the democratic political process in making decisions about environmental harm assessment and decisionmaking. 14 1 Environmental
problems and issues "can only be resolved through a political process
which is always imperfect, but which at least aspires to identify the public interest."' 14 2 Such decisionmaking would gain independent legitimacy
because the political process "creates the public interest in the process of
searching for it" precisely because the process would then possess "the
liberal virtues of broad participation, tolerance, and intelligent
43
deliberation."1
This "public choice" theory of decisionmaking'" is arguably incorporated into environmental law through both federal and state environmental impact statement requirements.145 Such statements are used as a
decisionmaking tool by government bodies making decisions about environmental hazard exposure. The impact statement allows public access
and participation in the process of analyzing the potential impact of particular proposed environmental hazard exposure on communities.146 As
DAILY J., Sep. 8, 1993, at 3.
141. Farber, supra note 117, at 1034.
142. Id. at 1043. Thus, for instance, instead of relying upon committees and bodies of
experts in setting levels of acceptable risk, attention would be paid to full disclosure and to
public participation in making such decisions. Id. at 1034. Though Farber notes that there is
good reason to question whether the risk preferences and estimations of risk levels revealed by
individuals and industries are reliable. Id. at 1035.
143. Id. at 1042. Thus, as Farber further explains:
After such a political decision has been reached, everyone present can say: "We have
decided such and such." The "we" is at once a reference to every member of the
group, and a new dramatic persona in its own right. Thus, the democratic process
earns the government the right to speak for "the Public."
Id. What Farber describes is akin to the "public choice" theory of administrative decisionmaking.

See generally DANIEL A.

FARBER &

PHILLIP P.

FRICKEY, LAW

AND PUBLIC

CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991) (discussing public choice theory).
144. A related theory is that of "republicanism," which embraces the process of collective,
deliberative dialogue among a community of citizens toward achieving the common good. See,
e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
Farber and Frickey, however, note that republicanism is the "antithesis" of public choice
theory:
Modern constructions of republicanism stress civic virtue .... By participating in
public life, citizens rise above their merely private concerns to join in a common
enterprise. They put aside their own interests and enter a public-spirited dialogue
about the common good.... Indeed, one of the most important tasks of government
is to make the citizenry more virtuous by changing individual preferences .... In
public choice, government is merely a mechanism for combining private preferences
into a social decision. The preferences themselves remain untouched.
FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 143, at 8, 44.
145. See National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988);
DANIEL P. SELMI & KENNETH A.

MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, §§ 10.01-.06

(1993) (discussing various state environmental requirements).
146. The federal statute is far less effective than many state statutes in achieving public
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one California court has recognized, the public participation and access
provisions of environmental impact statutes are "based on a belief that
citizens can make important contributions to environmental protection
and on notions of democratic decision-making .... 1,,47
While such "environmental due process" 14 8 opens up the decisionmaking process to allow more participation from previously excluded
and disproportionately affected constituents in resolving environmental
policy questions, I suggest that a much stronger mediating principle is
needed to address the phenomenon of environmental racism that has resulted, in part, from an already inherently free market political process of
environmental decisionmaking. In other words, a "free market" process
of political environmental decisionmaking will only result in the most
powerful interest groups being able to "bend the 'public interest' to their
liking"' 49 to affect the outcomes that are ultimately in their self-interest,
leaving the burdens of environmental policies to fall on those least able to
represent themselves in the political process.
Environmental law's process-oriented, public access approach to environmental decisionmaking can provide a vehicle to achieve environSpecifically, an approach to environmental
mental justice.
decisionmaking that evaluates institutional and structural decisionmaking according to whether it is free from racial or class domination can
answer the call for environmental justice. This would mean that decisionmaking processes would have to include those asked to bear the risks
of environmental hazard exposure.' 50 Impact statements, for instance,
could be given more weight in the decisionmaking process, and standards
could be set to ensure meaningful community participation in the impact
statement before it is deemed complete.' 5 1 Also, clearer standards about
access and participation in environmental decisionmaking. For instance, its requirement that
an environmental impact statement be prepared for review is activated only by "legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment ...."
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); see also Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Discrimination,41 KAN. L. REV. 271, 297-313 (1992) (describing the public access
provisions of, and analyzing the difference between, federal and state EIR requirements).
Reich notes that state environmental impact statement requirements are broader in scope and
thus "their application to translation problems can implement the access principle in favor of
minorities." Id. at 307.
147. Concerned Citizens of Costa Mesa, Inc. v. 32d Dist. Agric. Ass'n, 727 P.2d 1029,
1033 (Cal. 1986) (quoting Daniel P. Selmi, The JudicialDevelopment of the California Environmental Quality Act, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 197, 215-16 (1984).
148. Farber, supra note 117, at 1034 n.67.
149. Tomain, supra note 112, at 111.
150. Cole, supra note 41, at 661 (describing this as the "client empowerment" approach,
which enables "those who will have to live with the results of environmental decisions to be
those who actually make the decisions").
151. Impact statements have been criticized for their uselessness as a decisionmaking tool.
Specifically, the extent to which decisionmakers actually consider the information contained in
the statements has been called into question. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth
About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239, 245-48 (1973). The lack of "teeth" in NEPA, which
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the type of information to be included in impact statements could ensure
that the full ranges of impacts on a community would have to be considered before a decision could be made. The strongest version of an antidomination, justice-as-process model would be to allow communities to
make the ultimate decision about whether to bear the risks of environmental hazard exposure. This strong version assumes that communities
would have access to all relevant information about both the risks (e.g.,
health) and benefits (e.g., economic) of, for example, a proposed land use.
Emerging voices in the environmental justice movement mirror this
process oriented, antidomination model of justice on a more global level
in their calls for institutional reforms in environmental and other organizations that influence environmental policy and decisionmaking. These
include, explains Robert Bullard, moves toward "diversification of the
environmental movement" to "broaden its base to include minority, low
income, and working class individuals" and to broaden the narrowly defined agendas of the established environmental organizations to incorporate minority and working class community concerns. 5 2 That such
institutions and organizations are beginning to heed these calls is both
noteworthy and encouraging. For instance, EPA's recommendations for
including minority communities and individuals in its policymaking
processes and including considerations of the impact of environmental
hazard exposure on "high risk" populations in its risk assessment procedures signal a movement towards environmental justice that transcends
interest-group and distributional politics. 153 That calls for justice are being responded to and heeded in the environmental context signals another step in a slow progression toward full social equality.
CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE
IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

Much is at stake in the quest for justice in environmental law and
policy. Environmental racism has given new recognition to the fact that
the structural oppression of people of color in this society manifests itself
requires impact statements, renders it an ineffective way to achieve this justice-as-process
model of decisionmaking. For example:
What, then, is a developer to do upon learning that a proposed host community
already has a noxious LULU, while an acceptable alternative community has no
noxious LULUs but six social services LULUs? Rather than agonizing over the
"right" thing to do, developers will seek to minimize their costs, which will usually
mean putting the LULU in the community least able to use the impact statement to

fight the siting.
Been, supra note 51, 1067.
152. Bullard, supra note 11, at 92. I have also argued elsewhere that a substantive concept
of diversity could further social justice and equality goals through challenging structural and
institutional norms and processes of domination and oppression. See Sheila Foster, Difference
and Equality:A CriticalAssessment of the Concept of Diversity, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 105, 153-59
(1993).

153.

See

ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY,

supra note 2, at 26-29.
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in more ways than traditional civil rights based paradigms have previously recognized. Formal rights to basic necessities such as employment,
voting, and other amenities in modem life are now secure. There remains the nagging reality that, despite calls for a race-neutral consciousness, racial differences continue to exist in the distribution of benefits and
burdens borne by individuals in this society. It would be a mistake for
social justice advocates to pursue old distributive paradigms of justice in
trying to ameliorate racially disparate outcomes in environmental hazard
exposure. The essays in Race and the Incidence of Environmental
Hazards superbly demonstrate that such disproportionate outcomes result not only from the subtle nature of structural racism but also from
the nature of environmental policymaking and decisionmaking. The
conclusion of this set of essays demonstrates that the time is ripe for new
paradigms of justice.
Can the mainstream environmental movement bend to accommodate calls for social justice? EPA's EnvironmentalEquity report suggests
that there may be initial resistance to changing the old habits and normative assumptions that drive much of environmental law and policy.
However, in the end, I believe that the environmental movement will
meet the challenge by critically exploring the limitations of its decisionmaking processes and achieving a safe environment for us all. For now,
Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards and Environmental
Equity at least signal an effort to mediate the historical tensions that have
kept apart two seemingly compatible movements to make this world a
better place for us all. That, in and of itself, is an achievement.

